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ABSTRACT 
The Role (Relationship) of Visual and Motor Imagery in Estimating Reach.  
                                                 (May 2006) 
Diala Fouad Ammar, B.S., American University of Beirut;  
M.A., Sam Houston State University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Carl Gabbard 
The primary intent of this study was to explore fundamental questions about the 
role and relationship between motor (MI) and visual (VI) imagery within the context of 
estimating reach. Experiment 1 examined and compared VI and MI tasks under matched 
environmental conditions with the intent to explore the distinction and cooperation of the 
visual and motor systems in representing actions. The design of this experiment included 
an interference paradigm modified from Stevens (2005) in which six blocks of trials 
(conditions) were used: MI, VI, MI with visual interference, MI with motor interference, 
VI with motor interference, and VI with visual interference. Results indicated that MI 
was significantly more accurate than VI in regard to total error, distribution of error and 
mean bias (p ≤ .05). Significant increases in the number of errors and estimation bias 
were found when the modalities for the imagined task and the interference task were 
matched. The data showed that motor tasks interfered with the ability to MI, whereas 
visual tasks interfered with the ability to VI. Experiment 2 included a response-delay 
paradigm modified from Bradshaw and Watt (2002) in which eight blocks of trials were 
used: MI and VI conditions with no-delay and delays of 1-, 2- and 4 s. Overall, this 
experiment demonstrated that response-delay influenced accuracy of the MI 
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(visuomotor) task, but not the VI (perceptual) task. That is, after a 4s delay, error in MI 
increased significantly.  Interestingly, these results may indicate a crucial temporal 
constraint for the representation of distance, isolated in the visuomotor system.  In view 
of both experiments, the findings are consistent with the notion of a distinction between 
vision for perception (VI) and vision for action (MI) as advanced by Goodale, 
Westwood & Milner (2004). In conclusion, VI seems to delineate relevant spatial 
parameters within the environment and then transfer the information to MI. At this point, 
information is computed in terms of biomechanical possibilities for a certain movement. 
In summary, just as perception and action are firmly linked, so too are MI and VI.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Understanding the perception to action dynamics involved in reaching and 
grasping an object constitutes one of the most mystifying issues in motor behavior 
research. These actions require a complex set of perceptual to motor transformations.  
One of the initial steps is to derive a perceptual estimation of the object's distance and 
location relative to the body.  Complementing this process, the individual must scale the 
distance of the object in terms of his or her effective reach capabilities, which are 
constrained by both physical and mechanical factors. From a Gibsonian view (1979), the 
detection of the affordance for a particular mode of reaching entails perceiving whether 
the reach action will fit in the existing layout of the environment. This means that an 
individual must be able to perceive critical reach distances beyond which a particular 
reach action is no longer afforded and to which a transition to another reach mode must 
occur. Is the object close enough to reach while seated, or does one need to stand up to 
contact the object?  Arguably, this estimation forms the initial cognitive basis of the 
motor program, i.e., the cognitive level of action processing. The long-term goal of this 
research is to understand the mechanisms underlying this segment of action processing 
and its relation to motor execution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation follows the style of Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport. 
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The study of imagined versus actual movement affords an attractive approach in 
the quest to identify the specific mechanisms and relationships involved in action 
processing. One form of imagined movement, which is the focus of the work reported 
here, is perceived reach – the comparison between actual and perceived reach outcomes. 
Since Jeannerod (1994) made one of the initial arguments that action planning and motor 
preparation can be studied effectively using motor imagery, a multitude of studies have 
followed.  Broadly speaking, imagined movement, also known as motor and kinesthetic 
imagery, is an active cognitive process during which the representation of a specific 
action is internally reproduced in working memory without any overt motor output 
(Decety & Grezes, 1999). Motor imagery has also been described as the class of images 
of one’s own bodily movements that are used to simulate or ‘plan for subsequent action’. 
An important point with relevance to the present work is the distinction between motor 
imagery (MI) and visual imagery (VI). For successful movement, perceptual information 
needs to be transformed into action and the actor needs to consider biomechanical 
constraints, the spatial environment and the relationship between the two (Stevens, 
2005).  MI represents the kinesthetic and biomechanical constraints connected with the 
action, while VI is associated with the spatial component of the perceived environment. 
Nevertheless, the relationship between VI and perception is much less complex than the 
relationship between MI and action. In MI, estimation of reach takes into account 
biomechanical constraints, which are not considered in the case of VI.  However, MI is 
often associated with actions displayed within a visual environment; therefore leading 
many to suggest that MI and VI cannot be entirely separated. 
 3
Motor and Visual Imagery 
In regard to the general topic of imagined versus actual movement, a review of 
contemporary work, including neuroimaging studies, suggests quite convincingly that 
both share common (overlapping) neurocognitive networks which result in a high 
correlation between real and imagined movement (Decety, 1996; Glover, Dixon, 
Castiello,&Rushworth, 2005; Gonzalez, Rodriguez. Ramirez, & Sabate, 2005; Michelon, 
Vettel, & Zachs, 2006; Sheng, Latash, & Zatsiorsky, 2004) (also see Grezes & Decety's 
[2001]) meta-analysis).  Real and imagined movements activate many of the same brain 
regions, namely the primary and supplementary motor areas, pre-motor cortex, and the 
cerebellum (Gerardin, Sirigu, Lehericy, Poline, Gaymard, Marsault, et al., 2000; 
Jeannerod, 2001, Takahashi, Hayashi, Ni, Yahagi, Favilla, & Kasai, 2005).  However, it 
has also been suggested that, although the same network is involved in both real and 
imagined movements, the functional connectivity (coupling characteristics) within the 
network differs (Kilner, Vargas, Duval, Blakemore, & Sirigu, 2004; Solodkin, Hlustik., 
Chen, & Small, 2004). This general notion follows the reasoning of others that although 
imagined and actual movements may run in parallel (overlapping) networks, there 
appears to be dissociation at some level (Fischer, 2005; Johnson, Corballis, & 
Gazzaniga, 2001; Schwoebel, Boronat, & Coslett, 2002). 
Behaviorally, a consistent body of research shows that the duration of imagined 
movements ‘mirror’ executed actions (Decety, 1996; Gentilluci, Roy, & Stefanini, 2004; 
Papaxanthis, Pozzo, Skoura, & Schiepati, 2002; Sabaté, Gonzales, & Rodriguez, 2004). 
Complementing the ‘mirror’ observation, several studies also reveal that imagined 
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movements support Fitt’s Law – showing that, imagined movement duration like actual 
movement duration, increases with increasing task difficutly (Maruff, Wilson, De Fazio, 
Cerritelli, Hedt, & Currie, 1999; Sabaté, et al., 2004; Stevens, 2005). In regard to 
hemispheric control and limb use, it has also been reported that imagined movements, 
like real actions, are controlled primarily by the hemispheres contralateral to the 
imagined limb (Maruff et al., 1999). In addition, the researchers went on to suggest that 
imagined movements are subject to the same environmental and physiological 
constraints as real motor performance.  Complementing these observations are reports 
that the left-hemisphere (in right-handers) may have an advantage over the right brain in 
regard to imagined movement accuracy. This general finding has been shown in 
behavioral studies (Johnson, 2000; Maruff, et al., 1999; Sabate et al., 2004) and via 
examination of functional hemispheric asymmetry using motor evoked potentials 
(Yahagi & Kasai, 1999).   
As stated earlier, VI requires the representation of the spatial components of the 
perceived environment. A sizable body of literature suggests that VI retains spatial 
properties of scenes or objects.  For example, Dennis and Cocude (1989) asked 
participants to scan a memorized map and an actual map.  It took the same amount of 
time to complete either task.  Explanations for VI have been supported by several 
behavioral and clinical experiments.  For example, Behrmann, Winocur, and 
Moscovitch, (1992) reported that agnostic patients who lost the ability to recognize 
visual objects, retained the capacity to visualize images.  Observations from brain-
damaged patients show that preserved and impaired characteristics of visual perception 
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are similarly preserved or impaired during a VI task. The idea of overlapping networks 
between perception and imagery was also reported in a set of experiments looking at 
normal subjects. For example, Goldenberg, Podreka, Steiner, Willmes, & Deecke, 
(1989a, 1989b) used a regional cerebral blood flow analysis and reported activation of 
occipital and inferior temporal regions in normal participants performing VI and 
perception tasks. Similar findings have been reported after monitoring brain electrical 
activity (for a review, see Farah, Hammond, Levine, & Calvanio, 1988). The 
experiments mentioned above suggest that mental images in the visual modality are 
supported by the same neural substrate as perceptual images generated during normal 
perception. According to Jeannerod (1994), the precise relationship remains unclear.  As 
Musseler, Steininger and Wuhr (2001) so eloquently concluded - where perceptual 
processes end, cognitive processes start, and execution of motor actions begin, is key 
and yet to be defined.  
Most imagery studies have focused on VI to represent perception or on MI to 
signify action - the relationship between the two has received little attention (e.g., 
Stevens, 2005). Roland and Friberg (1985) studied an integrated visual-motor imagery 
task involving imagined walking within a specific environment and reported that brain 
activity occurred in visual as well as higher order motor cortical regions. This 
interpretation supports the view of Ungerleider and Mishkin (1982), who state that 
projections arising from primary visual areas follow two distinct pathways:  the ventral 
route involving the occipito-temporal pathway and inferotemporal cortex; and the dorsal 
pathway also involving the occipito-temporal pathway and posterior parietal cortex.  
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More recent literature suggests the same dichotomy with the ventral pathway mediating 
perception and the dorsal linked to action (Milner & Goodale, 1995).  However, this 
interpretation has not identified the explicit relationship between the two pathways and 
VI and MI.  
How are VI and MI different?  According to Solodkin et al. (2004), different 
strategies are used for MI and VI. For example, MI is hard to verbalize whereas VI is 
not. MI follows the same properties of executed movements (for example they both 
follow Fitt’s law) whereas VI does not.  In other words, MI cannot overcome the 
limitations of executed movements whereas VI can.  Also, similar physiological changes 
observed in executed movements are observed in MI (like increase in muscle voltage) 
but not in VI.   The networks for the two types of imagery are found to be different when 
each is compared to the networks used in actual movements.   MI and executed 
movements share several common elements which reinforces the idea that MI is truly 
involved with motor preparation, motor execution and motor learning.  In contrast, in VI, 
primary motor activation and sensory activation are not present; VI relies heavily on 
connectivity patterns originating in the occipital areas, which supports the idea that this 
behavior may be classified as a visual task (see Kosslyn, Thompson, Wraga, & Alpert, 
2001). 
Of special interest to the present study, Stevens (2005) used a selective 
interference paradigm to investigate whether separate representations underlie VI and 
MI.   Experiment 1 examined Fitt’s Law across visual and motor imagery conditions to 
provide a baseline difference between the two modes of representation.  Subjects were 
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asked to simulate walking along a wooden path, or imagine a black disc traversing the 
path.  Experiment 2 used a selective interference paradigm with participants completing 
two tasks simultaneously – imagining one of the following:  visual (a disc moving down 
a path), visual-motor (human walking a path) and motor (human running in place) 
combined with a visual (fixation), motor (stand on one leg), and visual-motor 
interference task. Results indicated significant increases in processing time from 
simultaneous inputs, compared to instances of a singular input. This was interpreted as 
evidence that the tasks were in competition for space on the same processing pathway. 
Stevens concluded, “The present set of experiments demonstrates cases of overlap 
between visual and motor imagery. Just as perception and action are tightly linked, so 
too are the counterpart representation systems” (p. 20). This paradigm has not been used 
in the context of perceived reach within the context of estimating distances. 
One of the common issues of interest that underscores much of the literature 
noted and both of the experiments presented here is the “two-visual-systems hypothesis” 
initially advanced by Milner and Goodale (1995) (see Goodale, Kroliczak, & Westwood, 
2005 for update) and recently debated by Jeannerod and Jacob (2005). 
Two-Visual System Hypothesis 
Although several methodological approaches have been designed in reference to 
understanding perceived reach, our attention is drawn to the nature of visual 
representation used in this event. Vision provides two important components for a 
successful reach.  First, it specifies the fundamental object properties necessary to pre-
plan the transport and the grasp component.  Second, it provides consistent “online” 
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feedback for fine-tuning of motor output (Jeannerod, 1988). Briefly, for an action such 
as reaching to grasp an object, the theory holds that visual information is transformed to 
a ‘perceptual’ representation that gives meaning to the environment and object. 
Combined with intention for action, this information is transformed to a ‘visuomotor’ 
representation; thereby suggesting separate and distinct perceptual and visuomotor 
streams. According to Milner and Goodale (1995), visual processing used in 
programming and controlling an action is different from visual processing needed for the 
perception and recognition of objects.  The researchers suggest that visually guided 
movements are mediated by visuomotor systems in the dorsal stream (e.g., Goodale, 
Milner, Jackobson, & Carey, 1991). The dorsal stream is a set of visual projections that 
start in the primary visual cortex and end in the posterior parietal cortex area.  On the 
other hand, they also argue that the perception and recognition of objects are mediated 
by ventral-stream projections, which also arise in the primary visual cortex, but project 
into the temporal lobe.  For example, patients with damage to the dorsal stream have 
impaired movements but demonstrate intact perception of objects (Perenin & Vighetto, 
1988; Milner, Dijerkman, Pisella, McIntosh, Tilikete, Vighetto, & Rossetti, 2001). 
However, a more recent update of the perception/action model (PAM), suggests that the 
ventral and dorsal streams interact (couple) to enhance optimal behavior.  This idea in 
general reflects the contemporary view of the “two-visual system” recently updated by 
Goodale, Westwood, & Milner (2004). 
More evidence for distinctive visual pathways for perception and action has been 
reported with normal subjects.  For example, the scaling of grip aperture in prehension is 
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influenced by the size of the object, but remains unaffected by size-contrast illusions that 
influence perceptual judgments of the size of the object (Carey, 2001). According to this 
account, size-contrast illusions only affect perception and not action because the ventral 
and dorsal streams compute different types of information about the object. Moreover, 
the perception and the action streams are speculated to operate under very different 
temporal constraints. According to Milner and Goodale (1995), perception and actions 
streams are contrasted in terms of their temporal properties. The dorsal pathway 
(specialized for the control of action) may not retain information in long-term memory 
and operates in real-time only (Goodale, Jackobson, & Keillor, 1994; Graham et al., 
1998; Hu, Eagleson, & Goodale, 1999).  The dorsal stream is thought to process 
extrinsic information like distance and direction of objects that change regularly over 
time.  In contrast, the ventral stream (specialized for perception) retains information over 
time).  This stream is thought to process intrinsic information such as the shape and size 
of the object that remain relatively constant over time.  
An interesting approach to investigate the nature of visual representation in 
action control and in this case imagery is to introduce a temporal delay between stimulus 
presentation and response. This paradigm has been used in pointing tasks (Bradshaw, 
Watt, Elliot, & Riddell, 2004; Bradshaw & Watt, 2002; Elliot & Madalena, 1987; Heath, 
Westwood, & Binsted, 2004; Westwood, Heath, & Roy, 2003) and prehension tasks 
(e.g., Hu et al., 1999). Experimentally, the use of a temporal delay has been shown to 
modify the features of visuomotor responses.  For example, Bradshaw & Watt (2002) 
found that a two-second delay is sufficient to disturb significantly prehensile movement. 
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They found that when presented with a delay, subjects exhibited reaches with lower peak 
velocities and lower peak apertures. Moreover, they used a perceptual-matching 
condition and found that accuracy, as well as variance, of a pointing task remained 
unaffected after imposing a temporal delay. Those findings support the notion that the 
visuo-motor pathway has limited memory and that response after a temporal delay may 
be sustained by representation stored in memory through the perceptual stream. 
 As mentioned before, perceptual tasks (e.g. recognizing the color of a target) 
have been separated from action-based tasks (e.g. reaching for an object) and differences 
in performance have been explained by functional dissociations of two independent 
streams, the ventral and the dorsal stream located in the temporal and parietal lobes, 
respectively. Several behavioral experiments have demonstrated that some patients can 
perform perceptual tasks but not visually- guided behavioral tasks (see, Goodale et al, 
1994); on the other hand, others are capable of performing normally on visuo-motor 
tasks, but not perceptual tasks (see Goodale et al, 1991).  
Statement of Purpose 
The primary intent of the present study was to explore fundamental questions 
about the role and relationship between motor and visual imagery within the context of 
estimating reach. That is, does VI and MI operate in similar, separate, or parallel 
streams? Stated differently, are perceptual and biomechanic representations processed in 
similar, separate, or parallel VI and MI processes?  And if the two streams are in fact 
separate, how are visual representations transformed into MI? How accurate are we at 
perceiving reachability under a VI paradigm, assuming that VI does not account for 
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biomechanical constraints? Is MI affected by response-delay, similar to how actual 
movement is affected by pre- movement-delay? Does reaching accuracy under VI 
remain unaffected by response-delay? 
 To address these questions, two experiments were designed.  Experiment 1 
examined the effect of interference on perceived reach while executing visual and motor 
imagery tasks. More specifically, with this experiment we wished to (a) delineate the 
differences in estimating reaching distances between use of VI and MI under matched 
environmental conditions, and (b) explore the dissociations and commonalities between 
the two visual modes by including a selective interference task. Experiment 2 
investigated the effect of response-delay on estimation of reach. This tactic has been 
used (as pre-movement delay) in several studies of movement execution but it is unique 
to imagined action research. When considered together, we anticipated that the results 
of these experiments would provide new insight into the use of visual information with 
the programming of imagined and real movements.   
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CHAPTER II 
STUDY 1 – INTERFERENCE EFFECTS 
Introduction 
The aim of Experiment 1 was to examine and compare visual imagery (VI) and 
motor imagery (MI) tasks under matched environmental conditions to explore the 
distinction and cooperation of the visual and motor systems in representing actions. 
Arguably, in the paradigm of imagined reach, both VI and MI are processing channels. 
As noted earlier, MI is defined as a dynamic state during which an individual mentally 
simulates a specific motor action (Decety, 1996). This definition implies that the subject 
“feels” himself/herself moving – which is a critical methodological tactic in imagined 
versus actual movement research.  In order to infer a high correlation with actual 
movements, MI must be sensitive to the biomechanical constraints of the task (e.g., 
muscle force and joint angle) (Jeannerod, 1999; Johnson, 2001).  On the other hand, VI 
involves perceived elements of the environment such as object location and size of the 
path.  According to Stevens (2005), the relationship between the two has received little 
attention, which underscores the aim of this experiment, which is, to compare imagined 
reach responses in conditions of VI and MI in different paradigms (no interference, 
interference with a motor task, and interference with a visual task).  
  Stevens addressed this issue through a series of behavioral paradigms using 
imagined movement times and selective interference effects in an attempt to understand 
the cognitive processes underlying visual and motor imagery. Experiment 1 examined 
Fitt’s Law across visual and motor imagery conditions to provide a baseline difference 
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between the two modes of representation.  Subjects were asked to simulate walking 
along a wooden path, or imagine a black disc traversing the path.  Experiment 2 used a 
selective interference paradigm with participants completing two tasks simultaneously – 
imagining one of the following:  visual (a disc moving down a path), visual-motor 
(human walking a path) and motor (human running in place) combined with a visual 
(fixation), motor (stand on one leg), and visual-motor interference task. Results indicated 
significant increases in processing time from simultaneous inputs, compared to instances 
of a singular input. This was interpreted as evidence that the tasks were in competition 
for space on the same processing pathway. The researcher found that VI was mostly 
used in order to represent perceived characteristics of the environment, such as object 
size; whereas MI was used to generate representations of “biomechanic-specific” 
features, such as human muscle force.  The interference effect, which included a motor 
task performed simultaneously with the VI paradigm, or a visual task performed with the 
MI paradigm, confirmed separate cognitive processes for visual and motor 
representation modalities.   
 The design of our experiment also included a selective interference tactic where 
subjects completed two tasks at the same time.  The interference paradigm was modified 
from Stevens: we added a visual task to the MI task and a motor task to the VI condition.  
We predicted that if the two visual streams are in fact dissociated, then the interference 
task should not affect the performance of the participant. Significant increases in the 
number of errors or direction of error (mean bias) would be interpreted as evidence that 
the two tasks are in competition for space on the same processing pathway. Here 
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imagined reachability estimates were measured across four conditions: VI (visual 
imagery), MI (motor imagery), VI and MI with motor interference and VI and MI with 
visual interference.  Significant increases in the number of errors or estimation bias was 
expected when the modalities for the imagined task and the interference task were 
matched. Given the assumption that the ventral stream is “metrically” challenged and the 
dorsal stream is a “metrically” accurate stream (Goodale & Humphrey, 1998), we 
predicted that participants would make more errors in VI compared to MI. Borrowing 
from previous literature (Bootsma, Bakker, Snippenberg & Tdlohreg, 1992; Carello, 
Grosofsky, Reichel, Soloan, & Turvey, 1989; Fisher, 2000, 2005; Heft, 1993; Mark, 
Nemeth, Gardner, Dainoff, Duffy, & Grandt, 1997; Robinovitch, 1998; Rochat & 
Wraga, 1997) we speculated that participants would overestimate in the MI condition. 
Also, we were tempted to predict that the overestimation bias for VI would be increased 
because the biomechanic representation of the movement would not be present. 
Methods 
 
Participants  
Participants included 29 (15 males and 14 females) right-handed volunteers 
between the ages of 19 to 23 years selected from a Motor Behavior Subject Pool at 
Texas A&M University. All participants were screened using a questionnaire to ensure 
that none had a history of past or present sensorimotor impairment.  For the purposes of 
this study, only subjects identified as strong right-handers (i.e., those for whom all items 
scored in that lateral direction using the Lateral Preference Inventory Questionnaire 
[Coren, 1993]) were included in the investigation.  All subjects signed informed consent 
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forms approved by our Institutional Review Board (IRB) before beginning the 
experiment and were naïve to the hypotheses under investigation prior to the study.  
 Apparatus  
A general illustration of the testing apparatus used to solicit perceived and actual 
reaching behavior is shown in Figure 1. Peer review of this setup has been conducted 
(Gabbard, Ammar, & Rodrigues, 2005a,b,c,d). Using a projection system linked to a 
personal computer (PC) programmed with Q-Basic software, visual images were 
systematically projected onto a table surface at the individual’s midline (90o) position. 
The table was constructed on a sliding bracket frame, allowing it be moved back and 
forward for adjustment to the participant; table height was fixed at 74 cm. Participants 
sat in an adjustable ergonomics chair fixed to the floor, aligned with the midline of the 
table and projected image midline, and set at a fixed height of 44 cm from the top of the 
seat pan to the floor. Table and chair height were adopted from Carello et al. (1989) and 
Heft (1993). A modified commercial seatbelt system, attached to the back of the chair at 
the upper torso level, was used to establish reaching limitations. The room was darkened 
with the exception of light from the computer monitor and white visual images projected 
onto the table programmed with a gray background surface. As noted earlier, our lab 
confirms that this setup afforded accurate measurement of actual and imagined reaching 
responses relative (scaled) to each participant.  
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Actual maximum reach
Imagined reach sites
Fixation point
 
Figure 1. General experimental paradigm. 
 
 
Procedure 
To begin, participants were systematically positioned in the ergonomic chair and 
introduced to the task for determining ‘actual’ maximum reach –fully extending their 
right limb and middle finger to pull back a penny using a 1-df reach (Carello et al. 1989). 
Based on the actual reach measurement, seven imagined target presentations were 
randomly programmed with “4” being the actual reach complemented with three image 
sites above and three below – 2 cm apart; 5 trials were given at each site. In the imagined 
condition subjects were asked to kinesthetically ‘feel’ themselves executing the 
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movement with the right limb – therefore being more sensitive to the biomechanical 
constraints of the task (Jeannerod, 1999; Johnson, et al., 2001).  
For MI trials, the dominant (right) hand was placed within a drawn box on the 
table close to the torso at midline while the non-dominant limb rested on the 
participant’s upper left thigh under the table. For VI trials, both limbs rested on the 
participant’s lap under the table. For VI trials, both limbs rested on the participant’s laps 
under the table. In this condition, we encouraged participants to disengage their own 
hand by instructing them to give a visual estimate of whether the target was reachable or 
not. We hypothesized that thinking about one's own hand would prompt motor 
simulation (MI) processes where participants would be more sensitive to the 
biomechanic parameters of the reaching movement. On the other hand, visual estimation 
(hands placed on the lap under the table) would most likely activate ventral pathways 
and hence be less sensitive to biomechanic considerations (adopted from, Sirigu & 
Duhamel, 2001).  Testing required six 20-minute sessions (within two weeks); one for 
each condition. Six blocks of trials (conditions) were used: MI, VI, MI with visual 
interference (MV), MI with motor interference (MM), VI with motor interference (VM), 
and VI with visual interference (VV). The visual interference task involved subjects 
fixating on a screen positioned at the end of the table while imaging the movement.  
Random block letters were projected for 500ms. The motor interference task consisted of 
subjects taping with their right foot (complementary lateral action) when they heard the 
first beep (before the target came up) until the target went away. Conditions were 
counterbalanced between subjects and stimulus presentation was given in random order, 
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following three practice trials (per block). Data collection began with a 5 s “Ready!” 
signal – that was immediately followed by a central fixation point lasting 3 s, at the end 
of which the participant heard a beep. The image appeared immediately thereafter and 
lasted for 500ms* [this speed was determined as the result of pilot-testing units in the 
range of 150ms to 2s] after which a second audible ‘beep’ provided the signal for the 
participant to respond. The participant was instructed to respond immediately with a 
“Yes” or “No” in reference to whether the stimulus was “reachable” or not. After each 
target presentation, the experimenter asked the subject the following question: “Is the 
target reachable?” No feedback was available to participants about the accuracy of their 
performance. 
Data Analysis 
 
The focus of analysis was to determine each participant’s accuracy in estimating 
whether or not each of the seven randomly presented ‘imagined’ stimulus targets were 
reachable or not; as noted by a “Yes” or “No” response. The basis for being reachable 
was derived from the participant’s actual reach at the midline position using the right 
(dominant) limb. Chi-square procedures were used to compare the six conditions in 
regard to total error, distribution of error across targets, and distribution of error between 
target responses.  Descriptive statistics and analysis of variance (ANOVA) procedures 
with Duncan’s post hoc tests were employed to determine estimates of error in terms of 
mean bias in cm; mean bias is defined as the general direction of error (i.e., over- or 
underestimation).  That is, data were given a positive or negative sign and then summed 
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to provide a signed mean.  All tests of significance were based upon an alpha level of 
.05. 
Results 
The first step in the analysis was to look at MI and VI under matched 
environmental conditions.  These data revealed that the paradigm used in the context of 
perceived reach was effective and provided a baseline distinction between the two 
modes of representations. 
MI vs. VI (Baseline) 
 Total error represented the percentage of wrong responses in relation to total 
trials for MI and VI conditions.  That is, when participants responded “no” when 
actually the target was within reach, or “yes” when in fact, the target was out of reach.  
Figure 2 shows the general response profiles for participants by condition – in this case, 
percent error in relation to total trials. Chi-square analysis indicated a significant 
baseline difference between MI and VI (χ2 = 3.85, p <. 05), with fewer errors in the MI 
condition. 
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Figure 2. Total error (%) for MI and VI baseline. 
 
 
In reference to the distribution of error (Fig. 3), although the general level of 
accuracy for both conditions was relatively high, with overall error only about 15% for 
MI baseline and about 26% in the VI condition, our attention at this point focused on 
where the errors occurred. The reader should keep in mind that there were seven targets 
presented at the midline position with “4” representing the participant’s actual maximum 
reach.  Incorrect responses at the three targets above (5-7) the actual target were 
considered an overestimation.  Incorrect responses at the four targets below (1-4) the 
actual target were considered an underestimation. For example, if a participant noted that 
target 5 was reachable (‘yes’) when in fact it was not, it was an overestimation.  The 
highest frequency of error occurred around target 4 for both MI and VI at a value of 
about 34% and 54% respectively. Chi-square analysis between targets indicated a 
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significant difference between MI and VI at target 3 (χ2 = 19.83, p <. 001) and at target 
4 (χ2 = 8.11, p <. 01). In essence participants were underestimating perceived reach with 
both MI and VI with a highest rate of “No” responses in VI.  
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Targets
To
ta
l E
rr
or
 (%
)
MI
VI
 
Figure 3. Distribution of error for MI and VI baseline. 
 
 
Needless to say, the results just mentioned are relative and a general observation. 
Figure 4 illustrates estimation values (mean bias) for MI and VI conditions.  These 
values were derived from mean error in cm for each condition; from actual reach (target 
4), each of the three higher (distal) and lower (proximal) targets were 2 cm apart.  That 
is, data were given a positive or negative sign and then summed to provide a signed 
mean.  Zero on the y-axis represents no error, while a minus value represents an 
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underestimation and a positive value represents an overestimation.  For example, if a 
participant noted that target 3 was not reachable (‘No’) when in fact it was, it was an 
underestimation. 
The ANOVA and follow-up procedures indicated a significant main effect of 
Condition, F (1, 29) = 4.27, p =.03. MI was significantly different from VI and 
participants slightly underestimated in both MI (-0.12) and VI (-0.27) conditions.   
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Figure 4. Mean bias (cm) for MI and VI baseline. 
 
 
MI with Interference 
 In reference to total error (Fig. 5), chi-square analysis indicated no overall 
difference between MI and MV (χ2=0.23, p=.70).  However, when comparing MI and 
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MM, an overall difference (χ2 = 4.68, p≤ 0.05) was found.  Participants exhibited more 
error in the MM condition (around 27%) as compared to the MI responses (around 15%).   
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Figure 5. Total error for MI interference condition. 
 
 
 An observation of the distribution of error across targets (Fig. 6) noted that the 
highest frequency of error occurred in the MM condition around target 4 at a value of 
about 80%.  Most of the errors for the MV condition occurred around target 4 and 5 at a 
value of about 50%.  At a lesser extent (about 33%), target 4 presented peak error for 
MI. Analysis between targets indicated a significant difference between MI and MV (χ2 
= 17.39, p <. 001), MI and MM (χ2 = 13.26, p <. 001) and MM and MV (χ2 = 48.44, p 
<. 001) at target 3. Also, a significant difference between MI and MV (χ2 = 4.63, p <. 
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05), MI and MM (χ2 = 5.77, p <. 025) and MM and MV (χ2 = 20.05, p <. 001) was 
found at target 4. 
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Figure 6. Distribution of error for MI interference condition. 
 
 
 Figure 7 illustrates estimation values (mean bias) for conditions. ANOVA results 
indicated a significant main effect of Condition, F (2, 29) =9.97, p<. 001.  Post hoc 
analysis (Duncan’s) revealed that MI was different then MM but not MV.  As shown in 
the figure, participants slightly overestimated in the MV condition and slightly 
underestimated in MI (-0.12) and MM (-0.28).  Note that the largest underestimation was 
made in the MM condition. 
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Figure 7. Mean bias (cm) for MI interference condition. 
 
 
VI with Interference 
 In reference to total error (Fig. 8), chi-square analysis indicated no overall 
difference between VI and VM (χ2 = 2.39, p = .17). However, when comparing VI and 
VV, a significant effect of interference was found (χ2 = 4.43, p≤ .05).  Participants 
exhibited most of the errors in the VV condition (around 40%) as compared to VI 
(around 26%) and VM (around 17%). 
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Figure 8. Total error (%) for VI interference condition. 
 
 
 Analysis of the distribution of error (Fig. 9),  revealed that the highest frequency 
of error occurred in the VV condition around target 3 at a value of about 76%.  Most of 
the errors for the VI and VM conditions occurred around target 4 at a value of about 
55%. Analysis between targets indicated a significant difference between VI and VV (χ2 
= 20.10, p≤ .001) and VM and VV (χ2 = 37.28, p≤ .001) at target 3. 
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Figure 9. Distribution of error for VI interference condition. 
 
 
 In regard to mean bias (Fig. 10), ANOVA results revealed a significant main 
effect of Condition, F (2, 29) =2.99, p≤ .05.  Follow-up indicated that VI was not 
significantly different from VM but, that VI and VM were significantly different 
fromVV.  Participants underestimated in all three conditions with VI (-0.27), VM (-0.27) 
and VV (-0.46).  
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 Figure 10. Mean bias (cm) for VI interference condition. 
 
 
Discussion 
Our intent in Experiment 1 was to investigate estimated (imagined) reach 
responses in conditions of VI and MI in different paradigms: no interference, 
interference with a motor task, and interference with a visual task. More specifically, we 
wanted to answer the following questions:  Does VI and MI operate in similar, separate, 
or parallel streams? Stated differently, are visual and biomechanical representations 
processed in similar, separate, or parallel VI and MI processes?  And if the two streams 
are in fact separate, how are visual representations transformed into MI? How accurate 
are we at perceiving reachability under a VI paradigm, assuming that VI does not 
account for biomechanical constraints?  
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Baseline Data 
 In reference to the baseline data (VI vs. MI), total error results indicated that the 
general response profiles for the two conditions were significantly different with less 
error in MI compared to VI. Further analyses to determine the distribution and direction 
of error, revealed that condition responses were different with higher error rates in VI.  
Most errors occurred around target 4; keeping in mind that target 4 represented actual 
maximum reach. In view of the general direction (mean bias) of error, although the 
analyses indicated that MI responses differed from VI, the margin of error was quite 
small for both conditions (-.12 cm for MI and -.24 cm for VI). When viewing the 
response profiles across both conditions, the general tendency was to underestimate; that 
is, answer ‘No’ when the target was in fact reachable. Once again, the margin of error 
from the actual target was small especially in MI, which gives further indication of the 
superiority of MI compared to VI in the context of perceived reach.  
From these results two key observations directed our attention.  First, was the 
fact that participants were consistently better in MI compared to VI. And second, was 
the observation that participants underestimated in both conditions. In regard to the first 
observation, although perception of reachability for both MI and VI was restricted by the 
same spatial parameters of the perceived environment, the translation of this information 
within each modality seems to be different. It appears that our results approximate those 
reported by Solodkin et al. (2004), suggesting the use of different networks for MI and 
VI.  In fact, the researchers concluded that MI follows very similar processes 
comparable to executed movements (e.g. Fitt’s law) whereas VI does not.  Furthermore, 
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the networks for the two types of imagery were found to be different when each is 
compared to the networks used in actual movements. In fact, as noted earlier, MI and 
executed movements share several common characteristics, reinforcing the involvement 
of MI with motor preparation, execution and motor learning.   
 Although our setup had no ‘time’ component, these results to some extent also 
support the conclusions of Stevens (2005) suggesting that Fitt’s Law holds for MI but 
not for VI.  In summary, representation processes used during VI seem to have preserved 
the spatial components of the movement while the ones used in MI appear to have 
translated the spatial information into human movement, therefore accounting for the 
constraints present within the system.  An interesting observation is that the errors were 
significantly different between MI and VI only around target 3 and target 4. VI is less 
accurate then MI at or around critical boundary. Further research would be needed to 
better understand this trend. 
 The baseline differences found between MI and VI appear to complement the 
views of Milner and Goodale (1995) stating that the visual processing used in 
programming and controlling an action are different from the ones needed for the 
perception and recognition of objects.  The researchers suggested that visually guided 
movements are mediated by visuomotor systems in the dorsal stream (e.g., Goodale et 
al., 1991). On the other hand, they argued that the perception and recognition of objects 
are mediated by ventral-stream projections. In line with our data and previous literature, 
it is reasonable to conclude that MI is relying on the dorsal stream which is “metrically” 
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more accurate, whereas VI is relying on the ventral stream which is metrically 
challenged (Milner & Goodale, 1995). 
Regarding the second observation, we initially predicted overestimations in both 
MI and VI with greater overestimation values in VI.  For MI, the literature reports 
overestimation at the midline position; for reviews of theories discussing the 
overestimation bias see Fischer (2000) or Gabbard et al., (2005a). In the present 
experiment, viewing time (total time that participants could see the target) was 500 ms as 
opposed to other experiments reporting overestimations with viewing time ranging from 
no time to 2 s. For example, in the case of Gabbard et al. (2005a), a similar experimental 
paradigm was used, but with a shorter viewing time (150 ms). As it appears in the 
present experiment compared to the example given using a different viewing time, 
participants were closer to actual reach but more conservative with longer viewing time.  
Obviously, future research needs to examine the influence of viewing duration on 
perceived reach.   
For VI, the underlying assumption for overestimation was that biomechanical 
constraints were not accounted for which in turn would generate a less conservative, 
more confident approach. However this prediction fell short given the underestimation 
values. Our results might be explained by the fact that participants were 
counterbalancing for the lack of biomechanical information by being over conservative 
in their response and therefore leading to increased underestimations. 
 32
  This phase of Experiment 1 provided a baseline difference between MI and VI.  
However, the question about whether the cognitive processes mediating these two types 
of imagery are distinct should be addressed. 
Interference Conditions 
 A selective interference paradigm was used in the next phase of experiment 1 in 
order to examine whether distinct cognitive processes underlie VI and MI.  In this type 
of paradigm, participants were asked to complete two tasks simultaneously.  Previous 
research reported that processing time for a spatial task is not affected by a verbal 
(Brooks, 1967) or visual (Baddeley & Lieberman, 1980) input presented at the same 
time because the two pieces of information apparently activate separate cognitive 
pathways. According to Stevens, “if the same cognitive operation must process a piece 
of information, such as two independent visual inputs, there is channel interference or 
build-up and a significant delay in processing time results” (p. 10). Consequently, we 
hypothesized that increased errors in perceived reach resulting from simultaneous inputs 
would be interpreted that the two tasks are competing for space on the same processing 
channel. 
In reference to MI, total error indicated no significant difference between MI and 
MV, but a significant difference between MI and MM.  Participants in the MI condition 
were more accurate then in the MM condition.  When the motor interference (foot 
tapping) was introduced, the accuracy of perceiving reachability was reduced.  That is, 
the same cognitive pathway had to process both information (MI and foot tapping 
simultaneously) and therefore affected the accuracy of the response profile.  Further 
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analysis to determine the distribution of errors in the MI interference task indicated that 
the highest frequency of error occurred in the MM condition around target 4. In regard to 
the interaction found at target 3 and target 4, we may speculate from a dynamical 
systems perspective that the system is relatively unstable around the critical boundary 
and may need to rely on both streams when deciding whether the target is reachable or 
not This interaction is not found around target 5 and might be explained by the 
possibility of the system regaining flexibility after crossing the critical boundary. In view 
of the general direction (mean bias) of error, although the analyses indicated that MM 
responses differed from MI and MV (which were not distinct from each other), the 
margin of error was quite small – about -0.25 cm from actual target. The small margin of 
error from actual target gives further indication of the relatively effective use of MI in 
conditions of MM, MV and MI.  
In regard to VI, total error indicated no significant difference between VI and 
VM, but a significant difference between VI and VV was found.  Participants in VV 
produced more error compared to VI and VM.  The increase in error in VV was expected 
because the interference task taxed the visual channel. In view of the distribution of 
error, the highest rate of error occurred in the VV condition around target 4.  Most of the 
error for VI and VM also occurred around actual reach but to a lesser extent.  Mean bias 
results indicated that participants underestimated in all three conditions with the highest 
underestimation in VV (-0.46). Analysis between targets indicated a significant 
difference between VI and VV and VM and VV at target 3. This significant difference 
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around critical boundary may again be explained as a phase of instability and possibly 
the convergence of the two streams.   
Overall, it appears that participants were more conservative and less confident in 
perceiving reachability when an interference task was introduced.  The load on the visual 
system (having to visually perceive the target and keep track of the letters presented on 
the screen) and the motor system (having to motor image the reaching movement and tap 
with the right-foot) may have generated an attentional load that may have induced more 
conservative (less confident) responses. 
Similar results for both motor and visual interference were reported by Stevens 
using three movement tasks: visual (DISC moving down the path), motor (RUN in place 
25 steps) and visual-motor (WALK down the path).  Imagined DISC movement times 
were found to be significantly longer in the visual interference condition and visual-
motor condition and imagined RUN times were significantly longer in the motor 
interference condition and visual-motor condition. VI was presumably used to represent 
the spatial coordinates of the task while MI most likely represented the biomechanical 
constraints of the task. The patterns of interference effects show that VI and MI tasks 
most likely operate within distinct processing mechanisms. An important point of 
interest regarding Stevens studies (experiment 2) is that both of the motor tasks used 
(RUN and WALK) involved the use of the legs.  In experiment 3, the researcher 
explored the question of whether distinct cognitive motor imagery processing can be 
made in terms of biomechanic specific tasks.  Two different motor tasks were used 
(running in place and clapping in place) in both biomechanically related and unrelated 
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selective interference conditions (leg-up and arm-up).  Imagined movement times were 
found to increase significantly when the interference task and the imagery task involved 
similar biomechanic demands. Unrelated interference tasks did not seem to affect 
imagined movement times. The author concluded that biomechanic specific processing 
occurs during motor imagery.   
Our results do not agree with the findings of Stevens where only related 
interference tasks affected imagined movements.  Although, the interference task used in 
our paradigm (foot tapping) was unrelated to the imagined motor task (imagined 
reaching), we did find that participants exhibited more errors in MM compared to MI.  
This discrepancy in results may be related to the nature of the tasks and the paradigm. To 
our knowledge, this is the first study investigating MI and VI in the context of perceived 
reach. 
The underestimation findings found for MI, MI interference, VI, and VI 
interference, lend additional support to our earlier suggestions that perceived reach 
includes considerations of perceived ability and perceived task demands (Gabbard et al., 
2005a). In our conclusions and those of Robinovitch (1998) and Carello et al. (1989), the 
word confidence is used in association with perceived reach. We suggest that 
confidence, in this context, is a cognitive state based on perceived ability and perceived 
task demands.  It seems reasonable to suggest that building up the system such as in the 
interference tasks paradigm used might significantly decrease our perceived ability and 
increase the perceived task demands and in turn a decrease in the confidence level 
results .Future extensions of this work should consider further examination of the 
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confidence notion – especially as it relates to the developmental aspects of reaching 
behavior. 
As mentioned earlier, VI is most likely used to represent spatial parameters (such 
as distance and size of target) while MI is most likely used to represent the biomechanic 
constraints of an action (such as muscle force and joint torque).  Keep in mind that the 
biomechanical parameters are processed relative to the spatial elements of the task 
(reaching in this case) and therefore MI depends heavily on VI for recognition of the 
spatial constraints in the environment.  Several studies have demonstrated separate 
patterns of brain activity associated with rotations tasks.  For example, Kosslyn, 
Thompson, Wraga, & Alpert, (2001) reported that rotation of objects are primarily 
associated with occipital and parietal areas, whereas rotation of humans hands or objects 
held by human hand activated motor areas including the primary motor cortex. Recent 
neuropsychological studies show that imagined object rotation may be considered a 
visual imagery task and is processed in the right hemisphere, whereas hand rotations 
may be considered a motor imagery task and is processed in the left hemisphere 
(Tomasino & Rumiati, 2004). 
In summary, it appears that MI and VI, in the context of perceived reach recruit 
different processing mechanisms.  The interference effects used in Experiment 1 
demonstrate that motor tasks interfere with the ability to MI whereas visual tasks 
interfere with the ability to VI. We do concede that this conclusion is limited to 
perceived reach tasks where the visual system would always be recruited to a certain 
extent because of the particular nature of the task 
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In regard to our initial questions relevant to Experiment 1: Does VI and MI 
operate in similar, separate, or parallel streams? Stated differently, are perceptual and 
biomechanic representations processed in similar, separate, or parallel VI and MI 
processes? The interference effects demonstrated separate cognitive processes mediating 
VI and MI.  MI appears to be associated with the dorsal stream whereas VI seems 
connected to the ventral stream.  These findings agree with the “two-visual system” 
theoretical model advanced by Milner & Goodale (1995), where a distinction is 
described between what has been called “vision for action” and “vision for 
perception”(p.131). 
And if the two streams are in fact separate, how are visual representations 
transformed into MI? It appears that the mechanisms underlying VI were most likely 
used to perceive spatial cues such as object size and location. In contrast, MI was likely 
used to perceive biomechanical demands such as torque and muscle force.  According to 
Stevens (2005), these modalities must run concurrently and concisely to produce 
significant representations of movements within the environment. 
How accurate are we at perceiving reachability under a VI paradigm, assuming 
that VI does not account for biomechanical constraints?  As mentioned earlier, VI and 
MI seem to operate in separate streams. VI is probably connected to the ventral stream 
which does not account for kinematic representation of movement resulting in less 
accurate responses in perceived reach.  In contrast, MI in our experiment appears to be 
associated with the dorsal stream which is restrained by the kinematic demands of the 
movement which resulted in more accuracy in perceived reach. These findings are 
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supported by Milner and Goodale (1995) suggesting that the dorsal stream computes 
absolute metrics and uses an egocentric frame of reference and is required for accurate 
actions. On the other hand, they suggested that the ventral pathway uses an allocentric 
frame of reference and computes relational metrics, giving detailed representation of the 
environment. 
In conclusion, VI seems to delineate relevant spatial parameters within our 
environment, then transfer them to MI which in turn would encode this information in 
terms of biomechanical possibilities for a certain movement. Just as perception and 
action are firmly coupled, so too are MI and VI. 
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CHAPTER III 
STUDY 2 – DELAY EFFECTS 
Introduction 
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to examine the influence of temporal (time) 
constraints on perceived reach. A response-delay paradigm was used to further 
understand the nature of the visual representation used in MI and VI.  In the present 
context, response-delay refers to the delay between stimulus presentation (visual 
information) and cue to respond to the reachability of the target. As mentioned earlier, 
this paradigm represents a unique approach to the study of imagined versus actual 
movement execution in the context of perceived reach. This paradigm offers an 
opportunity to explore the influence of time constraints on visual representation in 
simulating motor actions and the relationship to movement execution.  
As stated before, the act of efficient reaching relies on an internal representation 
of space and object prior to movement onset.  The presence of such representations 
facilitates the act of reaching for some period of time after visual feedback is removed 
(for example, reaching with eyes closed).  Previous research suggests that prehensile 
movements are disrupted by removal of visual cues (e.g., longer deceleration times), but 
general kinematic markers remain similar to when movement is executed under normal 
viewing conditions (Bradshaw et al., 2004, Bradshaw & Watt, 2002, Connolly & 
Goodale, 1999; Jackobson & Goodale, 1991; Jeannerod, 1984).    
Although the general paradigm of ‘delay’ is relatively unique in the context of 
perceived reach, it has been used in several studies of movement execution with adults 
 40
and children (e.g., Bradshaw et al., 2004; Bradshaw & Watt, 2002, Elliott & Madalena, 
1987, Heath et al., 2004; Hu et al., 1999; Westwood et al., 2003). Common movement 
tasks include pointing accuracy and reaching kinematics. For example, Bradshaw and 
Watt (2002) found that after a pre-movement delay of 2 s accuracy of pointing to a 
remembered location decreased, whereas the variability remained constant.  Moreover, 
in a ‘perceptual-matching’ condition the researchers found that both accuracy and 
variance were unaffected by delays of up to 4 s. In a subsequent study using children, a 
pre-movement delay of 2s was characterized by decrements in several kinematic 
measures (e.g., longer MT’s, lower peak velocities) (Bradshaw et al., 2004). Other 
researchers report similar results ranging from a decrement in movement behavior at 1 s 
and 5s (Graham et al., 1998; Hu et al., 1999).  
According to Viviani and McCollum (1983), movements of different amplitudes 
tend to have the same duration and this kinematic rule seems to hold in imagined 
movements. For example, subjects take the same amount of time to write small or large 
signature mentally. Viviani and Stucchi (1992) explain this as perception being 
constrained by motor schemas, which represent the implicit knowledge of the central 
nervous system concerning the constraints of the movement. If this explanation is correct 
then the kinematic rules governing actual movements should also control imagined 
movements (Jeannerod, 1995). In this case, we should see an increased frequency of 
error in imagined movements when a delay is introduced, comparable to the kinematic 
decrements reported by Bradshaw et al, (2004) and Bradshaw & Watt, (2002). 
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According to Goodale et al. (2004), visuomotor processes responsible for action 
control (and used in MI) do not seem to retain memory information about the target.  
Therefore, MI after a delay would seem to depend on information derived from early 
perceptual processing in the ventral stream. Given the assumption that imagined and real 
movements follow similar (corollary) neurocognitive paths, we predicted that response-
delay would show a similar profile as shown in studies of movement execution (e.g., 
Bradshaw, 2004). That is, at some point, introducing a delay will adversely affect 
estimates of reachability. On the other hand, if the relationship is not found, more 
credence could be given to the notion of dissociation between imagined and actual 
movements.  Given the assumption that the system involved in visuomotor control has 
only limited memory, we predicted that performance of reachability after a delay may 
rely on the ventral (perceptual) stream.   To test this assumption, we decided to include a 
VI condition with a similar response-delay paradigm.  Given the assumption that the 
ventral stream is “metrically” challenged and the dorsal stream is a more “metrically” 
accurate stream (Goodale & Humphrey, 1998), we predicted that participants would 
make more errors under VI compared to MI.  
 Based on results from Experiment 1, we predicted that participants would 
underestimate in both MI and VI with greater underestimation values in VI. In addition, 
given the theoretical and empirical basis for the experiment, we expected that accuracy 
in the MI task would decrease after a 2 s delay, whereas error in the perceptual condition 
(VI task) would remain constant when a delay was introduced. 
Methods 
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Participants 
 
Participants were 30 male and female right-handed volunteers between the ages 
of 19 to 23 years. All participants were screened using a questionnaire to ensure that 
none had a history of past or present sensorimotor impairment.  For the purposes of this 
study, only subjects identified as strong right-handers (i.e., those for whom all items 
scored in that lateral direction using the Lateral Preference Inventory questionnaire 
[Coren, 1993]) were included in the investigation.  All subjects signed informed consent 
forms approved by our Institutional Review Board before beginning the experiment and 
were naïve to the hypotheses under investigation.  
Apparatus 
 
  The same testing apparatus was used as described for Experiment 1. 
Procedure 
 
To begin, participants were systematically positioned in the chair and introduced 
to the task for determining ‘actual’ maximum reach - full extension of the right limb and 
middle finger to pull back a penny using a 1-df reach (Carello et al. 1989). Based on the 
actual reach, seven imagined target presentations were randomly programmed with “4” 
being the actual reach complemented with three image sites above and three below – 2 
cm apart; 5 trials were given at each site. Testing required four 20-minute sessions 
(within one week); two for each time condition. 
In the MI condition subjects were asked to kinesthetically ‘feel’ themselves 
executing the movement with the right limb – therefore being more sensitive to the 
biomechanical constraints of the task (Johnson, et al. 2001). For MI trials, the dominant 
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(right) hand was placed within a drawn box on the table close to the torso at midline.  
The non-dominant limb rested on the participant’s upper left thigh under the table. For 
VI trials, both limbs rested on the participant’s laps under the table. In this condition, we 
encouraged participants to disengage their own hand by instructing them to give a visual 
estimate of whether the target was reachable or not. We hypothesized that thinking about 
one's own hand would prompt motor simulation (MI) processes where participants 
would be more sensitive to the biomechanic parameters of the reaching movement. On 
the other hand, visual estimation (hands placed on the lap under the table) would most 
likely activate ventral pathways and hence be less sensitive to biomechanic 
considerations (adopted from, Sirigu & Duhamel, 2001).  
Eight blocks of trials (conditions) were used: no-delay with MI (M0), 1 s-delay 
with MI (M1), 2 s-delay with MI (M2), 4 s-delay with MI (M4), no delay with VI (V0), 
1s-delay with VI (V1), 2 s-delay with VI (V2), and 4 s-delay with VI (V4). Conditions 
were counterbalanced between subjects and each condition began with three practice 
trials. Data collection began with a 5 s “Ready!” signal – that was immediately followed 
by a central fixation point lasting 3 s, at the end of which the participant heard a first 
beep. The image appeared immediately thereafter and lasted for 500 ms (adopted from 
Bradshaw & Watt, 2002). All targets were presented in a random order. A second 
audible ‘beep’ then provided the signal for the participant to respond. In the no-delay 
conditions, participants were instructed to respond immediately with a “Yes” or “No” in 
reference to whether the stimulus is “reachable” or not.  No feedback was available to 
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participants about the accuracy of their performance.  In the delay conditions, the second 
auditory beep signal sounded following respective delays of 1s, 2 s or 4 s.  
Data Analysis 
 
The focus of analysis was to determine each participant’s accuracy in estimating 
whether or not each of the seven randomly presented ‘imagined’ stimulus targets were 
reachable or not as noted by a “Yes” or “No” response. The basis for being reachable 
was derived from the participant’s actual reach measurement at midline position using 
the right (dominant) limb. Chi-square procedures were used to compare the six 
conditions in regard to total error, and distribution of error across targets.  Descriptive 
statistics and analysis of variance (ANOVA) procedures with Duncan ‘s post hoc tests 
were employed to determine estimates of error in terms of mean bias in cm; mean bias 
represented the general direction of error (i.e., over- or underestimation). 
Results-MI Conditions 
Total Error 
 Total error represented the percentage of wrong responses in relation to total 
trials for the six conditions.  That is, when the participants responded “no” when actually 
the target was within reach, or “yes” when in fact, the target was out of reach. Figure 11 
shows the general response profiles for participants by condition. Chi-square analysis 
indicated no significant difference between M0 and M1 (χ2 = 0.57, p =0.57) and M2 (χ2 = 
3.71, p = 0.07).  However, when comparing M0 with M4, a significant difference was 
noted (χ2 = 3.96, p ≤ .05). All other comparisons did not reach the specified level of 
significance (p ≥.05) Participants exhibited the highest rate of accuracy in M0 with about 
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85% correct responses.  The rate of errors increased as the response delay increased 
(about 18 % for M1 and about 26% with M2) but did not reach a level of significance 
with M4 (about 27%).   
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Figure 11. Total error (%) for MI conditions. 
 
 
 Although the general accuracy was relatively high, with overall error only about 
25%, attention at this point was focused on where the errors occurred (Fig. 12.).  The 
highest frequency of error occurred around target 4, with participants in the M0 
condition exhibiting significantly fewer errors (about 34%) compared to M1, M2 and 
M4 (about 80%).  
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Figure 12. Distribution of error for MI conditions. 
 
 
Mean Bias (cm) 
 
 ANOVA procedures revealed a significant main effect of Condition,  
F (3, 29) = 14.61, p <. 0001 (Fig. 13).  Follow-up analysis indicated that M0 was 
significantly different then the three remaining conditions. Furthermore, MI with 1 s-
delay was not different from M2 but both were different then M4. Overall, participants 
underestimated in all four conditions with M0 (-0.12), M1 (-0.44), M2 (-0.34) and  
M4 (-0.57). Note in Figure 13 that the largest underestimation was made in the M4. 
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Figure 13. Mean bias (cm) for the MI conditions. 
 
 
Results-VI Conditions 
Total Error 
Chi-square analysis indicated no overall differences between V0 and V1 (χ2 = 
0.2, p = .74), V2 (χ2 = .11, p = .87) and V4 (χ2 = .24, p = .74). Total error in each 
condition was V0 (26%), V1 (24%), V2 (24%), V4 (23%). 
Distribution of Error 
 Although the general level of accuracy was still relatively high, with overall error 
only about 26%, our attention at this point focused on where the errors occurred.  The 
highest frequency of error occurred around target 4 at an overall rate of around 50%.  
Note that this result is similar to the MI conditions, but with significantly less errors in 
VI conditions when a delay was introduced (p≤.001). 
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Mean Bias 
 The ANOVA revealed no distinction (main effect) of Condition, F (3, 29) =.33,   
p =.80. Post hoc analysis indicated that V0 was not significantly different from V1, V2 
and V4, and no difference was found between all three delay conditions. Participants 
underestimated in all four conditions: V0 (-0.24), V1 (-0.23), V2 (-0.28) and V4 (-0.29). 
Once again, note that the largest underestimation was made in the V4 condition; 
however, the margin did not reach a level of significance. 
Results-MI vs. VI Conditions 
 One of the underlying assumptions with Experiment 1 was that there is a baseline 
difference between MI and VI.  Results indicated that there was a statistical distinction 
in which participants were more accurate in MI. Given the assumption, it also stood to 
reason that the comparison of M0 and V0 in Experiment 2 would be similar.  In regard 
to total error, chi-square analysis indicated a significant baseline difference between M0 
and V0 (χ2 = 3.85, p <. 05), with less error in the M0 condition.   
 In reference to the distribution of error, the highest frequency occurred around 
target 4 for both M0 and V0 at a value of about 34% and 54%, respectively. In essence, 
participants were underestimating perceived reach with M0 and V0 with the highest rate 
of “No” responses in V0. The ANOVA and follow-up procedures indicated a significant 
main effect of Condition, F (1, 29) = 4.27, p =.04; M0 was significantly different from 
V0 and participants underestimated slightly in both MI (-0.12) and VI (-0.27) conditions. 
 In view of combined errors for all MI-delay and VI-delay conditions, chi-square 
analysis indicated no significant differences between MI-delay and VI-delay conditions 
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(p≥.05). The profiles for the two conditions became very similar when a delay was 
introduced leading us to believe that the dorsal stream was no longer available for use 
and participants may have relied on the ventral stream. 
Discussion 
 
 The present experiment was designed to examine the effect of response-delays on 
perceptual and visuomotor responses. More specifically, this experiment aimed to 
examine the role of visual representation in judgments of reachable distances. As 
mentioned earlier, we used a response-delay paradigm which to our knowledge 
represents a unique approach to the study of imagined versus actual movement execution 
in the context of perceived reach. The overall results of this experiment showed clearly 
that introducing a temporal-delay affected the ability to perceive reachibility in MI 
conditions, but not in VI conditions.   
In reference to the MI-delay conditions, total error results indicated that the 
frequency of error significantly increased when a 4 s-delay was introduced; a significant 
difference between M0 and M4 was found. Further analyses to determine the distribution 
and direction of error revealed that most error occurred around target 4 with significantly 
more error in the delay conditions (about 80%); keeping in mind that target 4 
represented actual maximum reach. In view of the general direction of error (mean bias), 
analyses indicated that M0 differed from M1, M2 and M4 with no difference between 
M1 and M2, but with both conditions being different from M4. Overall, the range of 
error was quite small for all conditions, with increased underestimation in the delay 
conditions.  
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In reference to VI conditions, total error results indicated no difference between 
V0 and VI with delay conditions (about 25%).  Further analyses, revealed that most error 
occurred around target 4 (about 50%) across all conditions.  In regard to mean bias, 
participants underestimated in all four conditions with no significant difference between 
V0 and VI with delay conditions. As shown by the data, introducing a delay to VI did 
not affect the accuracy of the response; overall profiles of VI conditions remained very 
similar across conditions.    
From these results two key observations directed our attention.  First, was the 
fact MI was affected by delay, but VI remained relatively unaffected and invariable 
when a delay was introduced. And second, was the observation that participants 
underestimated in all conditions with increased underestimations in MI-delay conditions. 
In regard to the first observation, although perception of reachability for both MI and VI 
was restricted by the same spatial parameters of the perceived environment, the 
translation of this information within each modality seems to be different. It appears that 
our results approximate those reported by Bradshaw & Watt (2002) and Bradshaw et al. 
(2004), suggesting that a spatial representation for perceptual-motor exists and is 
separate from the conventional perceptual processes. They asked subjects to grasp 
objects of different sizes at varying distances after delays of 1, 2 and 4 s and found that a 
2 s-delay was enough to significantly affect the kinematics of a prehensile movement. 
Our results were very similar and consistent with the theoretical model advanced by 
Milner&Goodale(1995).  
 Regarding the second observation, based on Experiment 1, we initially predicted 
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underestimations in both MI and VI with greater overestimation values in VI. For MI, 
the literature reports overestimation at the midline position; for reviews of theories 
discussing the overestimation bias see Fischer (2005) or Gabbard et al., (2005a). In the 
present experiment, viewing time (total time that participants could see the target) was 
500 ms as opposed to other experiments reporting overestimations with viewing time 
ranging from no time to 2 s. For example, in the case of Gabbard et al. (2005a), a similar 
experimental paradigm was used, but with a shorter viewing time (150 ms). In 
comparing that study to our use of 500ms, participants (in our study) were closer to 
actual reach but more conservative, meaning they were underestimating.  Obviously, 
future research needs to examine the influence of viewing duration on perceived reach.  
Our data revealed that MI conditions were affected by delay resulting in increased total 
error and underestimation values.  Those findings were consistent with our original 
assumption that MI likely relies on the dorsal stream and therefore operates in real time. 
For VI, the underlying assumption for overestimation was based on the 
supposition that VI does not require biomechanical computations, leading to a less 
conservative approach.  However this prediction fell short given the underestimation 
values.  Our results might be explained by the fact that participants were 
counterbalancing for the lack of biomechanical information by being over conservative 
in their response and therefore leading to increased underestimations. VI-delay 
conditions remained unaffected when a delay was introduced which supported our 
original prediction.   
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These results are interesting not only in terms of how the memory for location 
operates for perceptual and visuomotor tasks but also because these data fit well with the 
“two-visual systems hypothesis” advanced by Milner and Goodale (1995).  The 
researchers speculated two separate specialized pathways, one used to perceive and 
represent objects and the other used to act on objects.  The two channels are also referred 
to as “perception” and “action” systems and operate under very different temporal 
constraints.  This theory advocates that the perceptual system processes intrinsic object 
properties (e.g. shape and color) and represents them in a relatively stable form, which is 
critical in order to perceive a stable world as our body moves.  In contrast, the 
visuomotor system operates in real-time, with no interest in the retention of object 
related information. Evidently, extrinsic object characteristics (e.g. distance and 
direction) change constantly due to ego- and object motion and therefore emphasis is 
given to fast computation and updating of information (Goodale, et al., 1994; Milner & 
Goodale, 1995).   
Consistent with this, Elliot and Madalena (1987) used a pointing task to 
investigate the effect of pre-movement delay on the accuracy of pointing movements. 
They found that each delay caused an increase in error in terms of distance and therefore 
concluded that a representation of the environment is only available for a short period of 
time (< 2 s).  Also, Gentillucci and Negrotti (1994) created a perceptual task where 
participants were asked to direct a laser pointer to the remembered location directly after 
target presentation. They found that pointing responses were accurate, whereas the 
perceptual responses generated significant overestimations of target locations. 
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More recently, Bradshaw and Watt (2002) and Bradshaw et al. (2004) explicitly 
compared perception and action responses using three different tasks: task 1 was unlit-
pen pointing, where participants were asked to reach and point to the location of the 
target as accurately as possible; task 2 was  lit-pen pointing, and task 3 was perceptual 
matching. They found that perception responses remained invariant with delays of up to 
4 s, whereas action responses were significantly affected after 2 s. They concluded that 
the introduction of a temporal delay only affected the accuracy of the pointing task, but 
not the perceptual task. Errors in remembered location responses increased after a delay 
of only 2 s.  In the present experiment, MI was significantly affected by a 4 s-delay as 
opposed to the 2 s-delay reported by Bradshaw & Watt (2002), and Bradshaw et al. 
(2004). This difference might be due to the nature of the task; this is the first study to our 
knowledge studying the effect of delays on perceived reach.  
 It is interesting to note that when a delay was introduced, MI profiles became 
very comparable to all VI profiles for total error, distribution of error and mean bias.  
Milner et al. (1999) found that the reaching performance of an optic ataxic patient 
ameliorated when a short delay was introduced which suggests that substitute 
representations do become accessible after a delay.  Our data suggests that the 
alternative representations were likely drawn from the ventral (perceptual) stream 
because MI with delay profiles were very similar to all VI conditions. It has been shown 
that when a delay is introduced prior to movement onset, the response (memory-guided 
reaching) no longer uses egocentric frames of reference; target location is though to be 
computed using a scene-based frame of reference independent of the performer (Hu & 
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Goodale, 2000; Krigolson & Heath, 2004).  In contrast, these suggestions were not be 
inferred by Bradshaw and Watt (2002). Here the researchers reported that when a delay 
was introduced to a pointing task, neither pointing accuracy nor kinematic measurements 
returned to baseline performance (in this study, the perceptual matching task remained 
invariant when a delay was introduced).    
 Overall, from the data presented here, it appears that the effect of a response- 
delay influenced accuracy of the MI (visuomotor) task, but not the VI (perceptual) task. 
After a 4s delay, error in MI significantly increased.  Interestingly that is, these results 
may indicate a crucial temporal constraint for the representation of distance, isolated in 
the visuomotor system.  These findings are consistent with the general distinction 
between vision for perception (VI) and vision for action (MI) as advanced by Milner and 
Goodale (1995).  
In regard to the initial questions relevant to Experiment 2: Does VI and MI 
operate in similar, separate, or parallel streams? The response-delay effects indicate that 
MI and VI appear to be mediated by separate cognitive processes. MI would appear to 
be associated with the dorsal (visuomotor) stream, whereas VI seems to be connected to 
the ventral stream. 
 Is MI affected by response-delay, similar to how actual movement is affected by 
pre- movement-delay? MI seems to be affected by response-delay just like actual 
movement is affected by pre-movement delay.  In fact, Bradshaw et al. (2004) 
demonstrated that reaches following pre-movement delay had longer movement 
durations, lower peak velocities, larger peak apertures and longer time spent in the final 
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slow phase of the movement.  They concluded that the introduction of a temporal-delay 
affected the accuracy of the pointing movement. 
Does r accuracy of perceived reach under VI remain unaffected by response-
delay? Our data, as well as data from studies using perceptual-matching tasks (e.g. 
Bradshaw & Watt, 2002), revealed that temporal-delay does not affect the accuracy of 
the response.   
In summary, it appears that VI and MI operate in separate streams. VI seems to 
be linked to the perceptual or ventral stream and therefore does not account for the 
kinematic representation of movement resulting in less accurate responses in perceived 
reach.  On the other hand, MI is likely connected to the visuomotor / dorsal stream and 
therefore follows the kinematic rules of actual movements resulting in more accurate 
responses. Delay seems to only affect MI which may reflect a major temporal constraint 
on the representation of movement through the visuomotor stream.  In general, these 
data support the theoretical model of Milner & Goodale (1995), in which the dorsal 
stream computes distance information in real time. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The primary purpose of this research was to explore fundamental questions about 
the relationship between motor (MI) and visual imagery (VI) within the context of 
estimating reach. That is, does VI and MI operate in similar, separate, or parallel 
streams? Stated differently, are perceptual and biomechanic representations processed in 
similar, separate, or parallel VI and MI processes? And if the two streams are in fact 
separate, how are visual representations transformed into MI? How accurate are we at 
perceiving reachability under a VI paradigm, assuming that VI does not account for 
biomechanical constraints? Is MI affected by response-delay, similar to how actual 
movement is affected by pre- movement-delay? Does reaching accuracy under VI 
remain unaffected by response-delay? To address these questions two experiments were 
conducted.  
Using an interference paradigm, the aim of Experiment 1 was to examine and 
compare VI and MI tasks under matched environmental conditions to explore the 
distinction and cooperation of the visual and motor systems in representing actions. 
Given the assumption that the ventral stream is “metrically” challenged and the dorsal 
stream is a “metrically” accurate stream (Goodale, 1998), we predicted that participants 
would make more errors in VI compared to MI.  Also, for the interference tasks, we 
predicted that significant increases in the number of errors would be interpreted as 
evidence that the two tasks are in competition for space on the same processing pathway. 
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Significant increases in the number of errors or estimation bias was expected when the 
modalities for the imagined task and the interference task were matched.  
Results indicated that the general response profiles for the baseline condition (MI 
vs. VI) were significantly different with more error in VI. These results agree with 
Solodkin et al. (2004) suggesting that different networks are used for VI and MI. The 
researchers used fMRI to distinguish between VI, MI and executed movements.  
Although our objectives did not include a measure of movement time, results to some 
extent support the conclusions of Stevens (2005) suggesting that Fitt’s Law holds for 
MI, but not for VI. That is, MI and VI seem to recruit distinct visual pathways; the 
baseline differences found between MI and VI also support the views of Goodale and 
Milner (1992) stating that visual processing used in programming and controlling an 
action are different from processes needed for the perception and recognition of objects. 
This baseline difference provided a theoretical basis to carry out the interference effects.   
In reference to MI interference conditions, results of total error, distribution of 
error, and mean bias indicated a significant difference between MI and MI with motor 
interference (MM).  In regard to VI conditions, results indicated a significant difference 
between VI and VI with visual interference (VV).  The interference effects in 
Experiment 1 demonstrate the likelihood that separate cognitive processes are used for 
visuo-motor and visual representations.  
In regard to our initial questions relevant to Experiment 1: Does VI and MI 
operate in similar, separate, or parallel streams? Stated differently, are perceptual and 
biomechanic representations processed in similar, separate, or parallel VI and MI 
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processes? The interference effects found appear to compliment the idea of separate 
cognitive processes mediating VI and MI.  MI appears to be associated with the dorsal 
stream, whereas VI seems connected to the ventral stream.  These findings are consistent 
with the theoretical model advanced by Milner & Goodale (1995), where a distinction is 
described between what has been called “vision for action” and “vision for 
perception”(p.131). 
And if the two streams are in fact separate, how are visual representations 
transformed into MI? It appears that the mechanisms underlying VI are most likely used 
to perceive spatial cues such as object size and location. In contrast, MI would appear to 
be used to perceive absolute metric and biomechanical demands. According to Stevens 
(2005), “these two modalities of representation must operate in a simultaneous and 
succinct manner for meaningful mental accounts of movements within the environment 
to result” (p.18). 
How accurate are we at perceiving reach under a VI paradigm, assuming that VI 
does not account for biomechanical constraints?  As mentioned earlier, VI and MI seem 
to operate in separate streams. VI is probably connected to the ventral stream which does 
not account for kinematic representation of movement resulting in less accurate 
responses. In contrast, MI in our experiment appears to be associated with the dorsal 
stream which is restrained by the kinematic demands of the movement resulting in 
estimates of reach. In general, these findings are supported by Milner and Goodale’s 
(1995) discussions suggesting that the dorsal stream computes absolute metrics and uses 
an egocentric frame of reference and is required for accurate actions. They also contend 
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that the ventral pathway uses an allocentric frame of reference and computes relational 
metrics, giving detailed representation of the environment. 
 Experiment 2 examined the role of visual representation and response-delay in 
judgments of reachable distances. According to Goodale, et al. (2004), visuomotor 
processes responsible for action control (and used in MI) do not retain memory 
information about the target.  Therefore, MI after a delay most likely depends on 
information derived from early perceptual processing in the ventral stream. Given the 
assumption that imagined and real movements follow similar neurocognitive pathways, 
we predicted that introducing a response-delay would decrease accuracy in the MI 
condition as shown in studies of actual movement execution (e.g., Bradshaw et al., 
2004). Given the assumption that the system involved in visuomotor control has only 
limited memory, we predicted that performance of reachability after a delay may rely on 
the ventral (perceptual stream) stream and combined MI-delay conditions profiles would 
become comparable to all VI-delay conditions.  The overall results of this experiment 
showed clearly that introducing a temporal-delay affected the ability to perceive 
reachability in MI conditions when a 4 s-delay was introduced, but not in VI conditions.  
From these results a key observation directed our attention; the fact that MI was affected 
by delay, but VI remained relatively unaffected and invariable when a delay was 
introduced. In regard to this result, although perception of reachability for both MI and 
VI was restricted by the same spatial parameters of the perceived environment, the 
translation of this information within each modality seems to be different. An alternative 
explanation to these results is that participants may still be using the dorsal motor stream 
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but since that stream does not operate in real time, the outcome resulted in an increase of 
error when a delay was introduced. 
 In regard to the initial questions relevant to Experiment 2: Does VI and MI 
operate in similar, separate, or parallel streams? The response-delay effects show that 
MI and VI appear to be mediated by separate cognitive processes. MI seems to be 
associated with the dorsal (visuomotor) stream, whereas VI appears to be connected to 
the ventral stream.  Is MI affected by response-delay, similar to how actual movement is 
affected by pre- movement-delay? MI seems to be affected by response-delay just like 
actual movement is affected by pre-movement delay.  Similar findings were reported by 
Bradshaw and Watt (2004) demonstrating that reaches following pre-movement delay 
had longer movement durations, lower peak velocities, larger peak apertures and longer 
time spent in the final slow phase of the movement. They concluded that the introduction 
of a temporal-delay affected the accuracy of the pointing movement. Does perceived 
reaching accuracy under VI remain unaffected by response-delay? Our data, as well as 
data from perceptual-matching studies (e.g. Bradshaw & Watt, 2002), indicate that 
temporal-delay does not affect the accuracy of the response.   
These data (Experiment 1 and 2), taken together address the greater question of 
whether VI and MI operate in similar, separate, or parallel streams. In both experiments, 
there were significant differences between baseline motor and visual imagery. The 
baseline condition results (MI vs. VI) indicate that overall, participants in MI are more 
accurate then in VI. These differences are consistent with the views of Goodale et al. 
(2005) stating that the visual processing used in programming and controlling an action 
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are different from processes needed for the perception and recognition of objects.  These 
findings also support the works of  Solodkin et al. (2004), suggesting the use of different 
networks for MI and VI.  In fact, the researchers concluded that MI follows processes 
comparable to executed movements (e.g. Fitt’s law) whereas VI does not. Also, as 
mentioned earlier, our setup had no movement time component, these results to some 
extent support the conclusions of Stevens (2005) suggesting that Fitt’s Law holds for 
MI, but not for VI.   
The results of both experiments appear to compliment the “two-visual systems” 
model described by Milner & Goodale (1995) and recently updated by Goodale et al. 
(2005). This model advocates that visual processing used in programming and 
controlling an action is different from visual processing needed for the perception and 
recognition of objects.  The researchers suggested that visually guided movements are 
mediated by visuomotor systems in the dorsal stream. They also argue that the 
perception and recognition of objects is mediated by ventral-stream projections, which 
also arise in the primary visual cortex, but project into the temporal lobe.  According to 
this account, the perceptual processes in the ventral stream use allocentric frames of 
reference that give meaning to the environment such as object recognition and object 
location.  In contrast, the dorsal stream uses egocentric frames of references and 
calculates absolute metrics necessary for rigorous and efficient movements.  
Consistent with the ideas of Goodale et al. (2005), our results indicate that MI is 
more accurate then VI. The dissociation found between MI and VI was present despite 
the fact that the experimental paradigm remained identical.  Both experiments were run 
 62
in darkness (except for the targets projected on the table) to exclude other visual cues 
that might be present within the environment; in other words, egocentric direction and 
distance were encouraged.  The ventral stream is thought to work better within an 
allocentric frame of reference which might have also contributed to baseline differences 
in total error between MI and VI.  
 In regard to Experiment 1, with the interference conditions, we found that MI 
was only affected when a motor interference was introduced and VI was only affected 
when visual interference was introduced. These findings would seem to indicate separate 
processing channels where VI most likely represents scene based characteristics, while 
MI is used to represent biomechanical parameters. In regard to Experiment 2, MI-delay 
accuracy decreased when a 4 s was introduced, whereas VI-delay remained invariable. 
These results are in agreement with the “two-visual system” model advocating that the 
perceptual system represents objects and stores them in memory for later actions, 
whereas the dorsal stream operates in ‘real-time’ using egocentric information and 
absolute metrics, required for accurate movements. Also, another key result that also 
supports the “two visual system” model is that MI-delay profile looked very similar to 
VI-delay profile. In other words, the control of reaching in MI after a delay depended on 
information derived from mechanisms in the perceptual (ventral) stream.  
A major theoretical question remains to be addressed and answered: are the 
ventral and dorsal streams independent? Or linked? Several recent findings support the 
general idea that perception and action are mediated by independent visual systems that 
compute information present on the retina differently. Neurophysiological evidence from 
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visual agnosia (Goodale, Jackobson, & Keillor, 1994) and optic ataxia (e.g., Revol, 
Rossetti, Vighetto, Rode, Boisson, & Pisella, 2003; Rossetti, Pisella, & Vighetto, 2003) 
reasearch provide support for two separate pathways; one for object-oriented action 
operating in real time and depending on visuomotor networks in the dorsal stream, and 
the second operates offline and depends on the perceptual mechanisms in the ventral 
stream. Using a variety of tasks, researchers have demonstrated critical differences 
between perception of a stimuli and control of action on that stimuli; underscoring the 
notion that perception and action engage distinct visual pathways (Burr, Morrone, & 
Ross, 2001;  Brown, Moore, & Rosenbaum, 2002; Dubrowski & Carnahan, 2002; 
Churchland, Gardner, Chou, ,Priebe, &Lisberger,2003; Kerzel & Gegenfurtner, 2003; 
Whitney, Westwood, & Goodale, 2003). Also, several experiments have shown that 
actions, such as grasping that are initiated after a delay (when the objects is no longer 
visible) are different from actions initiated while the object is visible (Hu & Goodale, 
2000). Although our study does not fully substantiate the exact use of visual information, 
our data is consistent with the two visual system hypothesis. These findings suggest that 
the control of actions after a delay may depend heavily on processing in the ventral 
stream (Goodale et al.2005). As a reminder, our results from Experiment 2 support these 
findings in that all MI-delay conditions became very similar to overall VI-delay 
conditions.  
Although the two streams are distinct in nature, the updated account of the two-
visual system model advocates that the ventral and dorsal streams, just like perception 
to action, are tightly linked (Guillery, 2005, Stevens, 2005). For example, research has 
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demonstrated that allocentric (ventral) and egocentric (dorsal) frames of reference 
interact to influence the trajectory and accuracy of a movement (Bradshaw et al., 2004; 
Krigolson & Heath, 2004; Stevens, 2005). Interestingly, the idea of the interaction of 
processes, rather than separate and distinct, is much more pronounced in recent updates 
of the two-visual system model as described by Goodale et al. (2005), and interpreted 
(by us) from the works of Bradshaw et al. (2004) and Stevens (2005).These findings 
suggest that the ventral and dorsal streams interact (couple) to enhance optimal behavior. 
Research shows that many actions depend on complex stimuli that can only be 
interpreted via the ventral stream (e.g. Goodale et al, 2005). The link between the 
visuomotor and perceptual stream support findings from several neurophysiological 
experiments reporting neurons in the posterior parietal cortex that are sensitive to 
stimulus features such as color and shape (e.g. Toth & Assad, 2002)  in paradigms where 
the stimuli are randomly mapped to object-directed actions; i.e. neurons in the dorsal 
stream are selective to  particular visual stimuli that are related to the required response 
rather than to the perceptual processing. 
 Although the present experiments addressed several prominent questions, our 
explanations were limited to behavioral work. First, despite the fact that we found a 
difference between MI and VI, there remains a slim possibility that participants in every 
trial did not kinesthetically imagine the reaching movement. Complementing this 
possibility, the nature of the task could have been a limitation; to our knowledge this is 
the first study to examine VI and MI in the context of perceived reach. Visual imaging a 
reaching action is more challenging then for example, looking at a disc moving (Stevens, 
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2005) because it is hard to disengage the self from the action. This study was also 
limited in the context of perceived reach rather then actual and kinematic parameters. 
Another limitation to this study is that our explanations for underestimation values were 
only based on speculations about confidence. Finally, our paradigm, due to its behavioral 
nature, could not depict the areas of the brain involved in MI and VI.  
 In regard to extension of this work, future studies should investigate the extent to 
which visual structures around a target might affect perceived reach accuracy. It has 
been shown that introducing a visual structure (physical or perceived) around a target 
enhances the accuracy of memory-guided actions (e.g. Lemay, Bertram, & Stelmach, 
2004; Krigolson & Heath, 2004). These results support the notion that memory-guided 
movements, as opposed to visually guided movements, rely on perceptual networks in 
the ventral stream that use a scene-based frame of reference. Such a study would 
reexamine the present conclusions that overlapping networks for visual pathways are 
critical for accurate reachability estimates. 
 In summary, the present set of experiments demonstrates that motor and visual 
imagery are processed within overlapping visual channels. The interference effects used 
in Experiment 1 demonstrated that motor tasks interfered with the ability to MI, whereas 
visual tasks interfere with the ability to VI. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the effect of 
a response- delay influenced accuracy of the MI (visuomotor) task, but not the VI 
(perceptual) task. Interestingly, these results may indicate a crucial temporal constraint 
for the representation of distance, isolated in the visuomotor system.  Taken together, 
these findings are consistent with the general distinction between vision for perception 
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(VI) and vision for action (MI) as advanced by Milner & Goodale (1995) and updated by 
Goodale et al. (2005). VI seems to delineate relevant spatial parameters within the 
environment and then transfer the information to MI, which in turn computes this 
information in terms of biomechanical possibilities for a certain movement Perhaps the 
original statement from Musseler, Steininger and Wuhr (2001) - where perceptual 
processes end, cognitive processes start, and execution of motor actions begin, is key 
and yet to be define - needs to be revised in view of the updated version of the two-
visual systems; perhaps a more relevant question that needs to be solved is “how the two 
visual streams work together in the control of our behavior” (Goodale et al., 2005).  
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